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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study 1b to explore the relation-
ship between intelligence level and memory on concept
attainment tasks where varying amounts of information are
given about the relevant attributes.
The process of concept attainment has beoome the focal
point of intensive research activity on an increasingly
greater scale. This development reflects the importance
accorded the role of concept attainment in the process of
adapting to our environment. Heidbreder (1947) has expressed
this thought in the following words: "It thereby places
conceptual activity among the important means by which the
human organism incorporates into itself through individual
learning and acculturation, novel modes of reaction which
become effeotive determinants not only of its motor be-
havior and symbolic activity, but of the very way in which
it lays hold perceptually on the environment, physical and
social, in which it lives and upon which it operates."
This introduction will be concerned with 1) the nature of
concepts, 2) the manner in which they are attained, and
3) the relationship between this process and some of the
potent variables that govern its course.
8Concepts and Concept Attainment
The functional role of concepts is vital to a success-
ful interaction with our environment. They allow us to
face a constant stream of incoming stimuli without being
overwhelmed by them; they allow us to order the world in
a consistent way so that we don't have to react to each
event as if it were a unique experience requiring a unique
response; they make it possible for us to make predictions;
and they provide a means of cheeking "what goes with what."
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin <1956) have proposed a
definition that embodies the above mentioned functions.
According to them, a concept is a "network of sign signifi-
oate inferences by which one goes beyond a set of observed
criterial properties exhibited by an object or event to the
class identity of the object or event in question, and then
to additional inferences about other unobserved properties
of an object or event."
Vinacke (1952) has suggested a definition in terms
of the so-called dynamic theory of cognition. It views
the concept as "a kind of organization of a person which
links previous experience and current states with stimu-
lus objects. Concepts are organized systems which have
Important structural relations with each other and which
have dynamic function in determining the on-going course
of thought." One of the objectives of the dynamic theory
of cognition is to emphasize the distinction between the
3name of the ooncept and the concept Itself. Vlnacke points
out that the usual definition tends to regard words as
concepts rather than recognizing that they are names given
to internal cognitive systems after the relevant mental
processes have occurred*
la contrast to those Investigators who have attempted
to make a clear demarcation between conceptual activity
and perception, Heldbreder (1952) has sought to establish
a relationship between them. She states that "concepts
refer to selected aspects of as well as to extensions beyond
perceived things and perceived situations." Implicit in
this position is the assumption that this conceptual mode
of functioning Is derived from and is a development of
that involved in the perception of concrete things. Thus,
it might be possible to view ooncept attainment in terms
of a continuum where a perception becomes a symbol when it
is caught up in a larger organization in which the func-
tional center is shifted further from the concrete and
receptive toward the abstract and constructive. In support
of this thesis, Heldbreder (1945) ran a study in which the
subjects were presented with a series of objects and de-
signs which they had to identify. The concepts to be
attained included concrete objects, spatial forms, colors,
and numbers. The results demonstrated that concepts were
attained in a definite order, positively correlated with
the degree of "thing" character attributed to the features
of their stimuli: concepts of concrete objects were
attained first, ooncepts of spatial forms next, then con-
cepts of colors, and concepts of numbers last.
Heidbreder, however, is not alone in noting this
phenomenon. Expanding on a term used by Katz (1935) to
refer to the impress ivoness of colors, Bruner has acknow-
ledged the possibility that preferred cues take on an
"elngreundlich" quality, Aooording to Bruner, in oonoept
attainment experiments using such meaningless attributes
as color and shape, the attributes that denote the concept
seem to take on a prominence or figural character while
the others seem to recede in figural value. Heidbreder
(1946, 1947) later replicated her results in studies in
which the stimulus material and perceptual character of
the instanoes were varied. In another study (1948), the
opportunity for object conceptualization was minimized.
The results supported the hypothesis "that at both the per-
ceptual and intelligence levels the concepts were attained
more or less readily as the criterial features of the
instance were more or less thing like and thus identifiable
by reactions more or less closely resembling those involved
in perceiving concrete objects. 1* (1948a), Heidbreder went
on to investigate whether the order of attainment broke
down and if so, under what conditions. She found that
where concept formation was able to take place on a more
peroeptual level and where only minimal demands were made
5on the organism, concepts were attained in a random order.
These results led Heidbreder (1947) to conclude that
M as the conditions decrease or increase situational sup-
port for the appropriate conceptual act they become more
or less taxing in the sense of drawing more or less heavily
upon the organism* s contribution - on its reactive resources
such as remembering, interpretation, and various symbolic
and constructive processes by which the organism is capable
of supplementing and reorganizing situations he apprehends
perceptually; that as conditions become more or less tax-
ing, the concentrated tasks they impose become more or
less difficult in the sense of requiring the organism to
overcome more or less resistance as it departs more or
less widely from preferred, perceptual modes of activity.*
Bruner et al. (1956) believe that the attainment of
concepts involves the construction of "rules of grouping"
that correspond to different types of concepts. They dis-
tinguish between three types of concepts: 1) conjunctive
concept - consists of the joint presenoe of appropriate
values of several attributes; 2) disjunctive concept - lacks
any apparent relationship between its attributes which can
substitute for one another} 3) relational category - defined
by a specifiable relationship between defining attributes.
Thus, there are different types of rules for grouping a set
of attribute values that correspond to differences among
concepts. Implicit in this approach is a decision making
process in which earlier decisions affeot the degrees of
freedom possible for later decisions. Regularities or
patterns of decision In the acquisition, retention, and
utilization of information are known as strategies. In a
learning situation, strategies often provide a systematic
means of handling information rather than allowing the
learner to lapse into a haphazard and inefficient mode of
operation. Through the use of strategies, the individual
can formulate hypotheses about what is going on in the
learning situation. According to Bruner et al. (1956),
there are two main strategies! a) the focus or wholiBt
strategy which bases the initial hypothesis on the first
positive instance and then alters or maintains It In the
light of subsequent instances encountered, and b) the
scanning or partist strategy which maintains a particular
hypothesis until it is infirmed by an instance and then
refers back to all instances previously met and makes the
necessary modifications.
The existence of two dominant strategies raises the
question of their relative attractiveness and effective-
ness. In a study designed to investigate these questions,
Bruner et al. (1956) informed their subjects as to the
number of attributes, the number of their corresponding
values, and the fact that the answer was a conjunctive oon-
cept. The subjects were asked to write down their best
guess of the concept after being exposed to each card and
7then to cover up their guess so that reference could not
be made to them. The results showed that the wholist
strategy was the preferred one. The experimenters con-
cluded that this was due to two reasons: 1) when the number
of attributes to be dealt with is relatively limited, a
person may be willing to deal with them all at once and
2) in view of the material used (circles, squares, etc.),
it is unlikely for subjects to have any strong preferences
about the relevance of particular attributes. However,
these two explanations do not really offer a sufficient
reason for the relative attractiveness of the wholist
strategy. In answer to the more significant question con-
cerning the relative effectiveness of both strategies, the
authors reply that "because the appropriate scanning follow-
up to a partial hypothesis is more mnemonic ally and infer-
entially demanding than the foouslng follow-up to an initial
whole hypothesis, the former strategy may be considered
more vulnerable to all those conditions that would make
record keeping difficult. tt This advantage existed at all
levels of task difficulty. For example, as the number of
attributes in the instance increased at a rapid rate, the
focusser was not as likely to get confused in remembering
his hypothesis as the scanner was in recalling past in-
stances.
The presence of a time strain also demonstrates the
8advantage of the wholist strategy, in a study (Austin,
Brunei*, and Seymour, 1953) whioh contrasted relaxed condi-
tions where the subjects worked at their own pace with the
ten second presentation period in the above study, the
same strategy emerged. Without time pressure and proceed-
ing at their own pace, wholist and partists do equally wellj
but, with time pressure, 63$ of the problems done by the
whollsts were solved while only 31# of the problems done
by the partists were solved.
The importance of the relative frequenoy of positive
and negative instanoes in concept attainment tasks has also
been extensively studied. It would seem that a large
number of negative instances (one not exemplifying the
ooncept being sought) places a strain on inference capa-
city and memory, regardless of whether the instance con-
firms or infirms the hypothesis in question. After much
investigation, Smoke (1952) indicated that negative
instances are inefficient in the learning of concepts:
"the experimental results furnish no statistical signifi-
cant evidence to the effect that ooncept learning proceeds
either more or less rapidly when the series contains both
positive and negative instances than when it contains only
positive," In another study (1935) that utilized a simul-
taneous presentation, Smoke obtained the same result.
However, he did find that negative instances tended to
discourage "snap judgments'* and to Increase accuracy more
9than when learning took place from positive instances
alone, This would seem to suggest that negative instanoes
play some role in the attainment of concepts albeit, at
the moment, an unknown one*
While Smoke minimized the importance of negative
instances in learning a concept, Hovland criticized his
procedure on the grounds that it did not control for the
information content of the two series, Hovland and Weiss
(1953) equated the information content and number of in-
stances so that any differences in learning the concepts
could be attributed to "differences in difficulty of assimi-
lating information concerning what the concept is" as
compared with assimilating information concerning what it
"is not," They found that the correct concept was attained
by a significantly higher percentage of subjects when trans-
mitted toy all-positive instances than toy all-negative in-
stances. In a second experiment, they found that mixed
positive and negative instances were intermediate between
all positive and all negative series in difficulty of
learning. The results also showed that when negative
instances are displayed simultaneously the accuracy of
concept attainment is higher than when they are attained
under successive presentation.
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Memory and Concept Attainment
One of the most important things about storing informa-
tion in the mind is the effect it has on our ability to
reoapture it for later use. The basis of this ability
rests on the organizing of Information that is assimilated
into the mind* If Information is to be recoverable for
service in a particular task such information must be
organized in a context related to the task. In experi-
mental designs used to study the relationship between
concept attainment and memory, the important issue should
not be the recalling of a particular object but, rather,
the making use of information it transmits about the con-»
cept. This question raises several problems concerning
the criteria to be used. Hunt (1961) has suggested that
"if the location of a particular instance related to the
instance presented before it or intervening between it and
the point at which the subject's hypothesis is offered
influences the tendency of the subject to offer hypotheses
consistent with this instance, we can infer memory for
information transmitted."
In an experiment by Hovland and Cahill (1960), a
series of negative instances were used to study the role
of memory in the acquisition of concepts. Each instance
was removed after presentation while in the control group
each one remained after presentation. The subjects were
told what dimensions were involved, how many were relevant,
and the number of values for each dimension (attribute).
Memory effects were studied by comparing the number of
cases where the guess was incompatible with Information
presented in the prior instance under the two conditions.
The results showed that guesses were seldom Incompatible
with instance* Just presented but, under the experimental
condition, they were increasingly discrepant from instances
further removed from the original instance. These errors
increased progressively with an increasing number of Inter-
vening Instances thus yielding an approximately linear
forgetting curve, Hovland and Cahill offer two explana-
tions for their resultst 1) it is possible that the
material presented earlier is attended to more closely
and is somehow more prominent, 2) it may be that at the
outset, fewer instances must be considered while later
more instances have to be considered and remembered in
drawing inferences, and this leads to confusion. The
authors conclude that if realistic conditions of concept
learning are to be simulated, future studies will have to
use situations where knowledge of the type of concept to
be presented is quite incomplete and also where there is
typical human fallibility of memory.
Hunt (1961) Investigated the use of Information that
is transmitted by a particular instance as a function of
its position in a series of concept defining instances.
His results are essentially a replication of those of
12
Hovland and Cahill; namely, an Interference effect was
found for instances intervening between information trans-
mitting instances and the beginning of the test series. A
linear relationship for the number of errors In identifica-
tion of the instances following the presentation of the
information bearing instance increased aa the number of
Instances between this Information bearing instance and
the test series increased. An interesting but statis-
tically non-significant result was that the number of errors
decreased with an increase in the number of instances pre-
ceding the key instance. This would seem to Indicate that
the number of these Instances dldn»t have a strong effect
on the subject 1 s ability to retain information.
The importance of set in the learning and retention
Of concepts was studied by Reed (1946) . His material
oonsisted of 42 cards that had nonsense syllables on the
back: and English words on the front, one of which belonged
to a category represented by the syllable. The task was
to learn the names of the cards and discover the category
for which the syllable stood. He found that a set to learn
meanings aa well as names yields a higher rate of learning,
a greater degree of retention, and a much larger number of
logical concepts than a set to learn names only. Heed
also found that concepts that were logically formed are
learned more quickly and better remembered than those
illogically formed. In a later experiment utilizing the
13
same procedures, the results indicated a slight inverse
relationship between the amount of retention of concepts and
the complexity of the stimuli from which they were derived.
The demand that a particular task places on one»s
memory governs, to a considerable extent, the choice of
strategy. For example, in a memory oriented task, the
partlst-scanner makes more demands on his memory than does
the whollst f ocusser. The focusser bypasses modifications
at each step to assimilate the new information acquired
from the instance he has enoountered. Thus, he need not
reoall past hypotheses or relationships between them be-
cause his present hypothesis is a summary of these. On
the other hand, the scanner must rely on his memory of past
instances whenever his hypothesis is infirmed by an in-
stance,
Yntema and Meuser (1960, 1962) investigated the
difficulty of keeping track of the current state of several
variables in a study that had no reference to concept
attainment. The task was to remember the present state of
several variables. The subject read a series of messages;
each one informed him about the state of one of the varia-
bles. He recorded them in such a way that he could not
see them once he had written them. At random intervals,
a series of messages was interrupted and he was asked to
recall what the last message about one of the variables
had been. The results indicated that the probability of
14
an error in Identifying the state of a variable increases
with an increase in the number of messages since the last
message (about that variable). A rather obvious finding
was that subjects kept better track of slowly changing
situations than of rapidly changing ones,
Sperling (I960) used lettered stimuli in an attempt
to study the quantitative amount of information available
to a subject after brief exposure. In one experiment, the
subject was required to report immediately only a particu-
lar part of the stimuli after its visual presentation. For
all subjects and for all stimuli, the available information
calculated from the partial report is greater than that
contained in the immediate memory span. It was found that
two or three times more information is available for par-
tial reports than for whole reports in which the subject
is required to report as much as possible of the entire
stimulus. However, information in excess of the whole
report is available for only a fraction of a second follow-
ing exposure. Employing psychophysical measures, phenomeno-
logical reports, and the above results, Sperling based his
explanation on the appearance of a subjective image or sen-
sation induced by the light flash (of the apparatus) which
outlasted the physical stimulus. Stimulus Information is
thus stored for a fraction of a second as a persisting
image of the objective stimulus. As the image fades, its
content decreases and the accuracy of reports based on it
15
decreases. This writer would like to indicate that these
results should be regarded with caution since only five
subjects were used.
A recent study by Kates and Yudin (1964) provides the
closest observation of the relationship between memory and
strategy, A successive, focus-successive, and simultaneous
method of presentation was employed. The strategy of the
subjects was classified into thre8 categories: 1) Ideal
strategy in which the subjects maintained their previous
presented hypothesis upon encountering confirming instances
and changed them upon encountering infinning instances;
2) Compatible strategy in which the subjects offered strategy
that was compatible with a presented instance but not com-
patible with all previously presented instances; 3) Incom-
patible strategy In which the subject changed his previously
presented hypothesis on encountering a confirming instance
and maintained the hypothesis upon encountering infirming
instances. The findings indicate that those subjects who
were exposed to the successive method of presentation
required a greater number of Instances to attain the con-
cept than the subjects with the focus-sucGessive presenta-
tion; these latter subjects required a significantly
greater number of instances to attain the concept than
subjects receiving the successive-simultaneous presenta-
tion of instances. With regard to differences in froquenoy
of strategy, subjects in the successive conditions followed
16
significantly fewer Compatible and Ideal strategies and
signifioantly more Incompatible strategies than subjects
in either the focus -sxiocessive or successive-simultaneous
groups. While the difference between the foovis-successive
and simultaneous -successive groups was in the expected
direction, it was not significant (the successive-simul-
taneous group followed more Compatible and Ideal strategies
than Incompatible ones).
Information and Concept Attainment
In most of the experiments on concept attainment, the
subjects have been informed of the number of attributes
to be used and the number of values that each one possessed.
There have been no studies in whloh the subjects were offered
information concerning both relevant and irrelevant attri-
butes before the task was actually presented. Research in
this area has dealt mainly with the effects of irrelevant
attributes on concept attainment.
Archer, Bourne, Brown (1961), in a two part study,
presented the subjeots In one experimental condition with
problems that contained two bits of relevant information
and one to three bits of irrelevant information; and, in
the second condition, presented problems with two bits of
relevant information, one to five bits of irrelevant infor-
mation and Instructions to use an analytical approach.
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They found that performance in conoept formation decreased
as a positive exponential function of irrelevant informa-
tion. In other words, the effect of increased amounts of
Information was to increase the number of errors in what
was probably an exponential function. Also, the results
indicated that the analytical instructions did not increas
the over-all performance of the analytically oriented
groups, Gonaazano and Grant (1958) noted that by inter-
mittently reinforcing various irrelevant attributes the
difficulty of sorting for others increased.
Intelligence and Concept Attainment
It Is a widely accepted belief that there exists an
intimate relationship between intelligence and conceptual-
ization. The importance that is accorded intelligence is
reflected in the use of conceptual tasks In intelligence
tests and in the tendency of many theorists to include it
in their list of primary mental abilities. Still, the
depth of the relationship is unknown. Much of the experi-
mental work in this area has dealt with oonoept formation
in children. As such, it is liable to confounding by the
chronological age factor; It would be unwise to extra-
polate these results to adult learning situations. How-
ever, in many studies, the results are worthy of note.
Hoffman (1953) administered the Weohsler-Bellevue
Scale for Adolescents and Adults to subjects ranging from
twelve to seventeen years of age. On the basis of these
scores he divided his subjects into a Subnormal group,
50-85; an Average group, 86-115; and a Superior group,
115 and up. Using geometric designs for tost material and
concepts suoh as Bise, symmetry, depth, and solidity as
tasks, he obtained evidence of a positive correlation
between scores on conceptual problems and intelligence
test groups in the Subnormal and Superior groups, but not
in the Average groups. Another interesting finding was
the fact that there was a closer relationship between
scores on concept problems versus verbal IQ scores than
between concept problems versus non-verbal IQ scores,
Hoffman offered a provocative explanation of the hetero-
geneity of scores in the Average group. He pointed out
that there were more similarities between individuals
located at high and low points of the intelligence scale
than at the middle of it. Thus, we must appreciate the
fact that when we use the term "average" with reference
to individual intellectual functioning, the average in-
dividual tends to be outstanding at some phases of mental
activity and inefficient in others.
In an interesting series of experiments, 03ler and
Fival (1960) used WISC scores to group 6, 10, and 14 year
olds into two levels of intelligence, Average and Above
Average, In one group the IQs ranged from 90 to 109, and
19
in the second group, the IQs extended upwards from a base
of 110. Using simple stimuli such as birds and animals
as concepts, they found that intelligence was associated
with significantly different performances in terms of
errors to criterion and number of successful subjects.
When they divided the subjects into sudden and pradual
learners on the basis of their learning curves, the fre-
quency of sudden learners was a function of intelligence.
Osier and Pival concluded that for this group this was
evidence for an association between intelligence and con-
cept attainment by hypothesis testing rather than the
continuity theory of learning.
Osier and Trautman (1961) attempted to follow up this
result with the same age levels and similar IQ groupings*
Thej reasoned that if hypothesis testing is more frequent
among superior than normal subjects, it should be possible
to influence the performance of the Superior group by
varying the number of irrelevant attributes on which
hypotheses can be based. For subjects of normal intelli-
gence, who tend to achieve solutions by the gradual build up
of an S-R association, no systematic relationship between
the number of stimulus attributes and speed of solution
was anticipated (this, though, in itself is a questionable
assumption). $hey presented their subjects with two ver-
sions of the same concept: one in which the irrelevant
dimensions were easy to perceive, and one in which the
20
authors assumed the diversity of shape, size, color and
context would suggest more hypotheses. A breakdown of the
data resulted in a significant interaction between Intel-
ligence and method of concept representation* The authors
suggest that this is due to the faot that the Above Average
subjects found the version with multiple irrelevanoies more
difficult than the less diversified versionj while the
subjects of normal intelligence found both types of stimuli
equally difficult. With the difficult version, the Above
Average subjects lost all advantage of high intelligence,
an advantage that was present in the easier version. How-
ever, it should be noted that the stimuli used were of a
very simple nature and that these results might not hold
for more complex problems.
In a later study (1962) in this series, Osier and
Weiss examined the influence of instructions on conceptual
performance in two levels of intelligence. Again dividing
6, 10, and 14 year old subjects into an Average and Above
Average group, she used two different sets of instructions,
an explicit and a vague set of instructions. The position
the authors took was that "Above Average subjects supple-
ment the E's instructions with their own directing them to
search for consistencies in reinforcing stimuli; whereas
less intelligent subjeots work along without self-instruc-
tions until the reinforcing contingencies of the experiment
strengthen the response to the concept exemplars," Thus,
21
according to Osier and Weiss, under vague Instructions,
there Is a "problem finding" as well as a "problem solving"
phase to a task. The results show that under non-specific
instruction, superior intelligence was associated with
more effective concept attainment but, under explicit
instructions, subjects of Average intelligence improved
while the Above Average subjeots did not change. This led
the experimenters to conclude that the vague instances gave
Above Average subjects an advantage only in the "problem
finding" phase of the task. However, again it should be
noted that with more complex stimuli and tasks, intelli-
gence might also be an advantage in the "solution" phase
of the task.
STATEMENT CEP THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this study Is to explore the relation-
ships between Intelligence level and memory in concept attain-
ment tasks where varying amounts of information are given
about the relevant attributes*
Several research Investigations have established the
existence of the above relationships. However, very few
studies have simulated conditions that more nearly approxi-
mate the typical everyday learning situations where
individual differences in ability and knowledge are the
rule rather than the exception. This study is an attempt
to abstract these conditions for additional investigation.
Thus, we will be able to note the way in which exposure
of relevant information previous to the task will affect
the performance of subjects across levels of Intelligence.
By contrasting their performance with subjects of similar
intelligence who receive no Information, we will be able
to observe whether such Information helps problem solving
efforts. It will also permit us to investigate whether
the person of average intelligence who has certain factual
information can perform as well as a person of high
22
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intelligence who possesses no detailed information.
Another issue we shall be investigating is the relation-
ship between memory and concept attainment under these
conditions. Most memory studios have relied on straight
reporting, recognition , or problem solving behavior after
exposure to the task. However, such situations are often
far removed from the typical everyday learning situation.
In a way, this study is analagous to observing the in-
dividual who comes into a learning situation where informa-
tion may or may not be available and where memory may or
may not be a factor in attaining a solution*
HYP0TH3SE8
The No Memory Group will a) solve significantly more
problems and b) will require significantly fewer
instances to solve them than the Memory Group,
The information Group will a) solve significantly more
problems and b) will require significantly fewer
instances to solve them than the Ho Information Group,
The High, Middle, Low Intelligence Groups will a) solve
more conceptual problems and b) will require fewer
Instances to do so, in that order.
The following interactions with respect to the number
of problems solved will be significant:
a) Memory x Information - there will be a greater
discrepancy between the performance of the
Memory and No Memory Groups when information is
not given than when information is given.
b) Memory x Intelligence - there will be a greater
discrepancy between the different levels of
intelligence in the Memory condition than in
the No Memory oondition; the Low Intelligence
Ss will be helped more than the High Intelli-
gence Ss by the No Memory condition.
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o) Intelligence x Information - there will be a
greater discrepancy between the different levels
of intelligence in the No Information condition
than in the Information condition; Low Intelli-
gence Sa will be helped more than the High
Intelligence Ss by the Information condition,
d) Memory x Information x Intelligence - Low Intel-
ligence Ss will be helped in conceptual attain-
ment more than High Intelligence Ss by less need
to rely on Memory and by greater information.
The following interactions with respect to the number
of instances required to solve the problems will be
significant:
a) Memory x Information - the difference between
the Memory and No Memory Groups will be greater
when information is not given than when informa-
tion is given,
b) Memory x Intelligence m there will be a greater
discrepancy in performance between the differ-
ent levels of intelligence in the Memory
condition than in the No Memory condition;
the Low Intelligence Ss will be helped more
than the High Intelligence Ss by the No Memory
,
condition.
o) Intelligence x Information # there will be a
greater discrepancy between the different levels
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of intelligence in the No Information condi-
tion than in the Information condition; Low
Intelligence Ss will be helped more than the
High Intelligence Ss by the Information con-
dition.
d) Memory x Information x Intelligence - Low Intel-
ligence Ss will be helped in conceptual attain-
ment more than High Intelligence Ss by less
need to rely on Memory and by greater informa-
tion.
METHOD
Subjeots: One hundred twenty male and female undergraduates
from an introductory psychology course at the University of
Massachusetts served as subjects in this study. The subjects
were divided into three levels of intelligence, High,
Middle, and Low, on the basis of scores attained on the
Scholastic Aptitude Test of the College Boards Examination.
This division yielded a High Intelligence Group of 40 sub-
jects that averaged in the seventy-sixth percentile on
both Quantitative and Qualitative parts of this test; a
Middle Intelligence Group of 40 subjects that averaged in
the fifty-sixth percentile on the Quantitative and fifty-
third percentile on the Qualitative} and a Low Intelligence
Group of 40 subjects that averaged in the forty-fifth and
fortieth percentile on the Quantitative and Qualitative,
respectively. These subjects were then divided equally
into two conditions of task presentation, Simultaneous and
Successive, Within each of these two task conditions,
there was a further breakdown into two conditions of infor-
mation presentation, Detailed Information and No Detailed
Information, Thus, altogether there were four groups of
,
30 subjeots (including 10 subjects from each intelligence
27
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Table 1
Experimental Procedure
Condition IQ Division
High IQ (10 Ss)
Memory - Information (30 Ss) Mid. IQ (10 Ss)
(F = 18
LoW IQ (1° SS)
High IQ (10 Ss)
No Memory - Information (30 Ss) Mid. IQ (10 Ss)
5* ~ Low IQ (10 Ss)(p ss 18
High IQ (10 Ss)
Memory - Ho Information (30 Ss) Mid. IQ (10 Ss)
[f I 18 LoW IQ (1° 86)
High IQ (10 Ss)
No Memory - No Information (30 Ss) Mid. IQ (10 Ss)
(M = 12 Low IQ ( 10 Ss )
2 9
level) with each group exposed to just one of the follow-
ing experimental conditions: Memory-Information, Memory-
No Information, No Memory -Information and No Memory-No
Information. The aame ratio of females to males, three to
two, was maintained in each of these four conditions.
Materials : A set of twelve problems was constructed on
cards using the following attributes: Shape, color, outline,
and number. Some of the problems consisted of instances that
had a top and bottom part, and some had parts that consisted
of just one line. An example of an Instance of the first
type of problem would be a red cross, blue circle, and
yellow square on top and a red star and green star on the
bottom; an example of an Instance of the second type would
be a blue cross, green square, and red diamond. Each prob-
lem contained either seven or eight instances, one or two
of which were negative (not containing the sought after
concept) • The number of instances in each problem con-
tained just so much information so that when the last
instance was encountered there was only one answer remain-
ing. A positive instance (which contained the appropriate
concept) was indicated by the presence of a plus sign in
front of it and a negative instance was indicated by the
presence of a minus sign. This feature applied to both
types of problems. However, if in the case of a top-bottom
type problem, part of the answer was in both the top and
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bottom, two signs were used* one in front of the top and
one in front of the bottom. The top and bottom part always
agreed in sign. These problems were originally constructed
by this investigator and were pilot tested to eliminate the
possibility of multiple answers. (Each of the problems can
be found in the Appendix in the order in which they were
administered
•
)
Experimental Conditions t Two versions of each problem were
employed, a No Memory and a Memory oondition. The former
consisted of a simultaneous presentation in which each new
instance was presented at the same time with all previous
instances on the same card. Memory condition was in the
form of a successive presentation in which each instance
was exposed in order without any of the preceding instances.
Each instance of a problem was presented on an individual
card. Examples of a simultaneous presentation of both
types of problem (with all of their instances) are shown
in Figures 1 and 2,
The Information condition was effected in the follow-
ing way. One or two attributes relevant to the solution
of the problem were extracted from each problem and printed
on cards; one card for each problem. For example, such a
card might have the words "color" and "outline" printed on
it if these attributes were relevant to the solution of
that particular problem. In half of the problems one
attribute was given and in the other half, two attributes
Figure 1: Example
of tfr© simultaneous
presentation of a
problem in whioh
eaoh instanoe has
a top and bottom
part*
AT
.a
n
0
Figure 2s Example of the simultaneous presentation
of a problem in which each instance consists of a
line of figures*
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were offered. However, in those problems with a top and
bottom part, each figure had the same solid outline so
that outline, as an attribute, was not relevant to the
solution of this type of problem. Therefore, to prevent
the establishment of any sets, all problems in which out-
line was possibly relevant to the solution were given first
before the problems with top and bottom parts.
Procedure t The subjects were tested in groups of approxi-
mately six to ten subjects. Each subject was given an
answer booklet and a cover-up card. Each page of the book-
let corresponded to a problem and contained enough lines
to match the number of instances in each problem. The
subjects were asked to write down what they thought the
answer was after each card was presented to them and then
to cover up their guess. Thus, if there were eight in-
stances to a particular problem, a subject made eight
guesses as to what he thought the answer was, but without
having reference to his previous guesses. Each instance
of a problem was plaoed in front of the subjects on a ver-
tical stand and exposed for approximately fifteen seconds.
Out of twelve problems that were constructed, three
were used for instruction and nine for actual testing.
The problems were given in what was thought to be an
ascending order of difficulty based on the results of the
pilot testing.
Depending on the experimental condition, the following
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set of instructions were used to acquaint the subject with
the nature of the task:
A set of problems has been constructed using
different geometric figures. The colors,
shapes, borders, and number of these figures
were varied. Each of the problems consists
of many parts. Some of the puzzles have parts
that have a top and a bottom like this one
(ex. is shown) and some of them have Just one
line like this (ex, is shown). This is only
one part of a problem; and this is what a com-
plete problem looks like (ex. is shown). The
answer to each problem is in the part that has
a plus sign in front of it. When a minus sign
is In front of a part the answer is not in
that part (ex. is shown). Now, it is important
to remember that there is only one answer to
each problem and this same answer, the right
answer is in each part that has a plus sign
in front of it. But the minus part doesn*t
have that answer in It. When you get a prob-
lem that has a top and bottom part, the answer
could be in the top or the bottom, or parts of
the answer could be in the top and in the
bottom. If part of the answer is in the top
and the other part in the bottom there will
be two plusses, one in front of the top part
and one in front of the bottom part like this
(ex. is shown).
When the problems with top and bottom parts
were reached, the following instruction was given
to all subjects. "In the remaining problems"
outline "will not be the answer to the problem
nor will it be relevant to finding the solution."
Supplementary Instructions for
Bach Condition
Information-No Memory
;
- since these problems
are difficult, every time I show you a new
instance, I will also show you the instances
that you have already seen before it. I am
also going to give you some hints which should
help you.
Informat ionMemory - these problems are very
difficult and whenever I show you a new in-
stance of a problem, you will have to remember
the parts that preceded it. I am going to
give you some hints which should help you.
No Information-No Memory - since these problems
are difficult, every time I show you a new
instance, I will also show you the instances
that you have already seen before it.
Mo Information-Memory - these problems are very
difficult and whenever I show you a new instance
of a problem, you will have to remember the
parts that preceded it.
Dependent Variables t To measure each subjeot's efficiency
in problem solving ability, the number of problems he
solved and the number of Instances he required to solve
them were recorded. This latter measure, number of in-
stances to solution, was computed by totaling up the number
of instances It took for a subject to solve all the prob-
lems and summing this total over subjects in each group and
within each test condition. Thus, an individual subject *s
score might be obtained in the following way? if he solved
Problem 1 giving the correct answer after the fifth instance
was exposed, he received a score of five for that problem.
However, if there were seven instances to a problem and a
subject failed to solve it after all the instances had been
exposed, he was assigned a score of eight, one more than
the number of instanoes in that particular problem. This
was done to distinguish between those subjects who solved
the problem on the very last instance presented and those
who failed to solve it at all.
RESULTS
The first hypothesis, part A, was supported by the
results. The subjects that were exposed to the No Memory
oondition solved significantly raore problems than the Memory
Group (Tables 2 and 4) . part B of this hypothesis was also
confirmed (Tables 3 and 5), The No Memory Group required
fewer Instances to solve the problems than the Memory
Group,
The seoond hypothesis, part A, was also supported by
the results. The subjects that were provided with speci-
fied information solved s ing ifleantly more problems than
those subjects who were not given such information (Tables 2
and 4). Part B of this hypothesis was confirmed when the
Information Group required significantly fewer Instances
to solve the problems than the No Information Group
(Tables 3 and 5)
.
The third hypothesis, part A, was confirmed by the
superior achievement of the High Intelligence Group rela-
tive to that of the Middle and Low Intelligence Groups;
the latter group solved the fewest number of problems.
Part B of this hypothesis was supported by a similar order
of performance with respect to efficiency of problem solving
efforts.
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Problems Solved
sv dfs SS MS F p value
Total 119 569.30
Memory (A) 1 24.00 24.00 11.11 .005
Inform. (B) 1 175.06 175.06 84.91 .001
Intell. (c) 2 56.00 28.00 13.58 .001
Mem, x Inf. (AB) 1 30.00 30.00 14.80 .001
Mem. x Int. (AC) 2 21.30 10.60 5.14 .01
Inf. x Int. (BC) 2 37.40 18.70 9.08
.005
Mem. x Inf. x Int. (ABC) 2 2.54 1.27 .62
Ss/M x I x I 108 223.00 2.06
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for
the Number of Instances to Solution
I dfs SS MS P p value
Total 119 16807.47
Memory (A) 1 974.69 974.69 11.47 .001
Inform. (B) 1 3686.03 3586.03 42.23 .001
Intell. (C) 2 2015.82 1007.91 11.87 .001
Mem. x Inf. (AB) 1 .85 .85 .01
Mem. x Int. (AC) 2 141.06 70.53 .83
Inf. x Int. (BO) 2 850.22 425.11 5.00 .01
Mem. x Int. x Inf. ( ABC)2 68.70 34.35 .40
Ss/ M x I X I 108 9170.00 84.90
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Number
of Problems Solved for the Main Effects
# Solved Mean. s.D.
Memory 252 4.2 1.12
No Memory 3X4 5.0 1.28
High Intelligence 226 5,5 1.20
Middle Intelligence 188 4.7 1.05
Low Intelligence 152 3.8 1.10
Information
No Information
359
207
6.0
3» 5
.97
1.27
4G
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Number
of Instances to Solution for the Main Effeots
Memory
No Memory
$ of Instances Mean
3716
3433
62.0
57.2
S.D.
9.31
8.26
High Intelligence
Middle Intelligence
Low Intelligence
2152
2470
2526
53.8
61.7
63.2
11.01
8.19
8.00
Information
No Information
3246
3901
54.1
65.0
10.49
7.69
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Turning to the interactions, Hypothesis 4a was con-
firmed, indicating that the different combinations of
Memory and Information (AB) affected the number of prob-
lems solves (Table 6). A Duncan Range Test was run on the
size of the predicted discrepancy between the No Memory
and Memory Groups when no information was given} it was
significant at the .01 level. When Information was provided
there was no significant difference between these two groups
(Tables 6 and 7, Figure 3). One result that raises many
interesting questions was the superiority of the Informa-
tion-Memory condition over the No Inforraation-No Memory
condition. This difference in the number of problems solved
was significant at the ,01 level; and most of the difference
can be traced to the significantly different performances
between the High Intelligence Ss in these two conditions.
The Memory x Intelligence (AC) interaction supports
Hypothesis 4b which predicted that the difference In the
number of problems solved between the levels of Intelli-
gence would increase when Memory became an important factor.
The difference between the various levels of Intelligence
in the Memory condition was significant at the .01 level
(Tables 8 and 9, Figure 4). The effect of the Memory condi-
tion on the High Intelligence Group was practically non-
existent, whereas the Middle and Low Intelligence Groups
suffered a significant decrease In the number of problems
42
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of
Problems Solved for the Memory x Information Interaction
# Solved Me en S.p.
Memory-Information 171 5,7 1.04
Memory-No Information 81 2.7
No Memory-Information 188 6.6
1.21
.89
No Memory-No Information 126 4.2 1.33
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Table 7
Results of Duncan Range Tests of the Number of Problems
Solved for the Memory x Information Interaction
No Inf-Mea No Inf-No Mere Inf -Mem Inf-No Mem
Ho Inf-lfiem .01 .01 ,01
No Inf-No Mem .01 .01
Inf-Men
Inf-No Mem
44
Memory
No Memory
190
180 \
0
IHF NO INF
Figure 3: The total number of problems
solved by the subjects in the Memory Group
and the No Memory Group in the Information
and No Information condition.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviation for Number of Problems
Solved for the Memory x Intelligence Interaction
# Solved Means S.D.
Mem-High Intell llO 5.5 1.12
Mem-Middle Intell 79 3.9 1.06
Mom-Low Intell 63 3.2 1.10
Ho Mem-High Intell 116 5.8 1.19
No Mem-Middle Intell 109 5.4 1.05
No Mem-Low Intell 89 4.5 1.11
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High IQ
------ Mid. IQ
H k as ac-at Low IQ
120
NO MEM MEM
Figure 4: The total number of problems
solved by High, Middle, and Low Intelli-
gence subjects in the No Memory and Memory
conditions.
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solved (Tables 8 and 9).
The significant Information x Intelligence (BO) inter-
action supports Hypothesis 4c. However, information helped
the relatively High Intelligence Group more than it aided
the Middle or Low Intelligence Groups in the number of
problems solved. The differenoe between High, Middle, and
Low Intelligence in this condition was significant at the
.01 level (Tables 10 and 11, Figure 5). It should also be
noted that there is no significant differenoe between the
performance of the Low Intelligence Group and the High
Intelligence Group when the former group was provided with
information and the latter group was not given such infor-
mation (Tables 10 and 11)
•
Contrary to expectation, there was no second order
(ABC) Interaction between the three main effects and
Hypothesis 4d was rejected.
With respect to the presence of interactions on the
second dependent measure, Hypothesis 5a was disconfirmed
by the results. Thus, the discrepancy in the number of
instances to solution between Memory and Ho Memory did not
increase when information was not given. However, as was
the oase with this interaction on the first dependent
measure, the Information-Memory Group was also able to
solve the problems more efficiently than the No Information-
No Memory Group. This difference was Just barely signifi-
cant at the .05 level (Table 13); and most of this difference
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of the number of Problems
Solved for the Information x Intelligence Interaction
# Solved Means S.D.
Ho Inform-High IQ 78 3.9 1.45
Ho Inform-Middle IQ 74 3.7 1.16
Ho Inform-Low IQ 55 2.8 1.20
Inform-High IQ 148 7.4 .95
Inform-Middle IQ 114 5.7 .95
Inform-Low IQ 97 4.9 1.01
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High IQ
- Mid. IQ
X B I 3! ]| K L°W *Q
Figure 5; The total number of problems
solved by the High, Middle, and Low
Intelligence subjects in the Information
and No Information conditions.
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Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Problems
Solved for All Combinations of Memory, Information,
and Intelligence
Inform-No Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
# Solved
78
61
52
Means
7.5
6.1
5.2
S.P.
.83
.84
1.02
Inform-Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
73
53
45
7.3
5.3
4.5
1.07
1.06
1,00
No Inform-No Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
41
48
37
4.1
4.8
3.7
1.55
1.26
1.20
No Inform*Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
37
26
18
3.7
2.6
1.8
1.35
1.08
1.20
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Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Instanoea t
Solution for the Memory x Information Interaction
o
# of Instanoes Meana S.D.
11.41
Memory-Informatioa 1691 56.4
Memory-No Information 2025 67.3 6.99
No Mem-Information 1555 51,8 9.48
No Memory-No Inform 1878 62.6 8.42
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is due to the significant difference between the High Intel-
ligence Ss in both of these conditions.
The results also failed to confirm Hypothesis 5b, the
Memory x Intelligence (AC) interaction; the difference
between the levels of intelligence in the Memory condition
was not significantly greater than that in the No Memory
condition. One result of this interaction, that was consistent
with the same interaction on the first dependent variable,
was the fact that the High Intelligence Groups did not per-
form significantly different under the No Memory condition.
The Intelligence x Information (BC) interaction on
this dependent measure was also significant, confirming
Hypothesis 5c (Tables 15 and 16, Figure 6). Its direction
was quite similar to that of the same Interaction on the
first dependent variable, number of problems solved. How-
ever, although it was significant, the discrepancy between
the performances of the levels of intelligence was greatest
when information was present than when it was not. This
is, again, a reversal of the predicted location of the
greatest discrepancy. When Information was provided, the
difference between High and Middle to Low Intelligence was
significant at the .01 level whereas there was no signifi-
cant difference in the performance of these groups when
information was not given (Tables 15 and 16). Here, also,
when Low Intelligence Groups have the advantage of informa-
tion over the High Intelligence Group, there is no
55
Table 14
Mean. and standard Deviations of tha ot
To solution for th. «amory x Xntollig.no. int9r.otion
# of Instances Means S.D.
Mem-High IQ 1108 55.4 11.75
Men-Middle IQ 1290 64.5 8.75
Mem-Low IQ 1318 65.9 7.12
No Mem-High IQ
No Mem-Middle IQ
No Mem-Low IQ
1045
1108
1208
52.5
59.0
60.0
9.73
7.63
8.94
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Table IS
Means and standard Deviations of the Number of Instances to
Solution for the Information * Intelligence Interaction
# of Instanna a Means s.D.
No Inform-High IQ 1854 Q2^ ^
No Inform-Middle IQ lg84 ^
No Inform-Low IQ l364 ^ f^
Inform-High IQ 8S8 44.9 1S.90
Inform-Middle IQ ll86 59#3 8<Q4
Inform-Low IQ 1162 ^ g^Q
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Figure 6s The total number of instanoes required
to solve the problems for the High, Middle and
Low Intelligence subjects in the Information and
No Information condition.
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Table 17
»ans and Standard Deviations of Number of Instances
To Solution for All Combination, of Memory,
Information, and Intelligen <see
Inform-No Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
Inform-Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
No Inform-No Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low iq
No Inform-Mem-High IQ
Mid IQ
Low IQ
§ of Instanoaa Means S.p.
43.8 10.61458
573
544
460
613
618
607
607
664
646
677
700
57.3 8.04
54.4 9.«50
46.0 15.00
61-3 9.84
61.8 9.41
60.7 9.96
60.7 7.22
66.4 7.97
64.3 8.50
67.7 7.66
70.0 5.83
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significant difference between them in the number of
instances needed to solve the problems
.
Hypothesis 5d,whioh anticipated a second order inter-
action (ABC), was again not supported by the results.
Sex was not considered as a main effect in this
design; and an analysis of the data showed no difference
between the sexes in problem solving ability.
DISCUSSION
The results concerning the three main effects reinforce
the widely held belief that memory, intelligence, and infor-
mation play integral and potent roles in conceptual behavior.
The significantly better performance of the High Intelli-
gence, No Memory, and Information Groups was anticipated
almost by definition alone. Thus, the obtained confirma-
tion of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 was not surprising.
The hypothesized success of the No Memory Group mani-
fests how the burden of cognitive strain, because of need
to remember information from previously presented instances,
can interfere with concept forming behavior.
The value of Information as a means of guiding and
organizing one's conceptual activities, anticipated in
Hypothesis 2, was evident in both the Memory and No Memory
conditions. Information enabled the subjects to bypass
the irrelevant material to reach the more salient relation-
ships between the attributes.
With respect to Hypothesis 3, Highly Intelligent
individuals demonstrated that they are able to organize
and manipulate given information for their own purposes
61
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in situations where memory is both required and not required.
Similarly, when no additional information is given, they
are better able to utilize their intellectual powers to
seek and sort out the salient oues that will enable them
not only to solve the problems, but to solve them at a faster
pace. In their study with six, ten, and fourteen years old,
Osier and Weiss pointed out the possibility that the Above
Average individuals may supplement the E's instructions
with their own to search for consistencies in reinforcing
stimuli. On the other hand, the less intelligent individuals
work along without supplementary self -ins true t ions until
the reinforcing contingencies of the experiment strengthen
the response to the concept exemplars. Further evidence
for such hypothesized behavior exists in the fact that High
Intelligence Ss required fewer instances to solve the prob-
lems than the Middle Intelligence subjects, who were superior
in this respect to the Low Intelligence Ss.
The confirmation of Hypothesis 4a showed that the effeet
of information was greater in the Memory condition than in
the No Memory condition. In the Memory condition, it alle-
viated some of the burden and pressure from a subject's
mnemonic devices permitting a faster and more accurate solu-
tion of the problems. When it is recalled that a mild
stress condition was present in the form of a limited period
of exposure to the instances composing a problem, the neces-
sity for rapid, structured processing of data becomes
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readily apparent. That such stress was present oan be
deduced from the superiority of the No Memory Group over
the Memory Group. The faot that this superiority was
greatest when information was lacking, rather than when it
was given, suggests that information can help the learner
to focus his mental powers on the more relevant aspects of
a concept. In addition, these results fit in well with
Kates and Yudin's findings that successive presentation
requires a greater number of instances to attain a concept}
and that having to remember a large amount of information
taxes not only one*s mental energies but also interferes
with the organization and integration of one's symbolic
activities.
An intriguing question connected with this Memory x
Information Interaction is why the subjects in the
Information-Memory Group performed better on both dependent
measures than the No Information-No Memory Group. What it
seems to suggest is that having access to specified informa-
tion even when memory demands are stringent Is more helpful
in concept attainment than being exposed at any one time to
all the information provided by all the previously exposed
instances; reliance upon memory, in the latter case, is
minimized greatly. To view it another way, the reliance
upon memory is less of a hindrance than the failure to pro-
vide information. Hints about the correct attribute provide
an anchoring point from which an individual can launch his
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search for the salient values and for the relationships
between the relevant attributes. In a memory condition,
a hint serves as a guide, as well as a focal point around
which one can collect relevant information and keep it more
oasily in nind because of its more meaningful relationship
to other information. If information is to be recoverable
for service in a task, it must be organized in a context
related to the task. Thus, although there is added cogni-
tive strain due to the Memory factor, it is more than
counterbalanced by the help informational hints provide by
directing attention to the relevant attributes. In faot,
the potency of information was further demonstrated in this
study, when this condition, Information
-Memory, performed
almost as well as the most favorable condition for learning,
the Information-No Memory. Possibly, any inference about
Information versus Ho Memory condition is speculative be-
cause the High Intelligence subjects in the No Information-
No Memory oonditlon unexpectedly performed below their
antieipated level. It is not exaotly clear why the High
Intelligence Group did not perform better than the Middle
and significantly better than the Low Intelligence Groups
in the No Information-No Memory condition. This experi-
menter is inclined to think that it was a chance happening
and that with a larger number of problems, the effect of
High Intelligence would have been more apparent.
The poor performance of the No Information-Memory
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Croup demonstrates that „lthout any^^
attributes the subject ceding to rely upon for
information about previously presented instsnee., ia faced
with the task of foxing Mny hypothe.e, from the myriad of
possibilities that arise mi*- «p ..vm c out of the numerous permutations
and combinations of the attributes; he then must remember
the information previously presented so that he can retain
»dify, or reject irrelevent hypotheses. That such is
probably the case wa. amply demonstrated by Hovland and
Cahill (l96o) and y„tema and M.u.er (1960, 1962)
. Ia the
first experiment, Hovland and Cahill used a similar explana-
tion in
.hewing that in a simultaneous presentation, guesses
were „U
- incompatible with instance, juat presented
.
However, under the successive condition they
.ere increasingly
di.erepant from Instance, further removed. The se errors
increaeed progressively with an increasing number of inter-
vening instances. The authors concluded that at the outset,
rawer instance, must be considered and remembered in drawing
inferences, and that the increasing number of instances lead
to confusion. In interna and Beu.ar-s work, it was found
that the possibility of m error in identifying a state of
a variable inorea.es with sn increase in the number of mee-
sages since the last message about that variable. Our
explanation ia also in accordance with Archer. Bourne, and
Brown-. (1961) finalng that tha Qf lmmmm
of information in the form of combinationa of varying
.mounts
6b
of irrelevant and relevant information is to increase the
number of errors
,
The highly significant Memory x Intelligence inter-
action «ith regard to the number of problems solved, suggests
that the Mo Memory condition was more helpful for the Middle
and Low Intelligence Groups than for the High Intelligence
Group. When memory was not a factor, the Middle and Low
Intelligence Groups were able to function at a relatively
high level. However, under memory stress, the effect of
differential intelligence came to the fore and the rela-
tively stable performance of the High Intelligence subjects
under both memory conditions may be taken as a reflection
of the potency and stability of superior intelligence. The
stress upon their memory was not as great because of their
better methods of storing and retrieving information.
The significance of the hypothesized (4e) Information x
Intelligence interaction was overshadowed by the fact that
the location of the largest discrepancy between levels of
intelligence was the reverse of that which was expected.
It was thought that if the No Memory condition proved to
be more of a help to the Low Intelligence subjects than the
High Intelligence subjects in the Memory x Intelligence
interaction, then the Low Intelligence Ss would also bene-
fit more than the High Intelligence 3e from the presence of
information. However, instead of being consistent with the
confirmed Memory x Intelligence interaction, the High
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Intelligence subjects suffered the greatest decrease in
number of problems solved and in the efficiency with which
they solved the,, m other words, the supplying of informa-
tion apparently aided the High Intelligence Ss more than
it helped the Low Intelligence Ss.
Mother interesting and important result within the
context of this interaction, is the finding that the Low
Intelligence subjects performed better than the High Intel-
ligenoe subjects when they had access to specified informa-
tion that was not available for the latter group; the Low
Intelligence Group in the Information condition were better
problem solvers than the High Intelligence Group in the No
Information condition. These findings tend to support Osier
and Trautmen's suggestion that Above Average subjects faced
with proolems, the presentation of which is based on multiple
irrelevaneies versus a less diversified version where things
are more focalized, lose much of the advantage of High
Intelligence. Thus, it may be that High Intelligence Ss
make better use of information that only hints at the next
steps for organizing and synthesizing the relevant attri-
butes; but they may suffer a relatively greater handicap
in the transition to an unstructured situation.
In another sense, the great increase in the efficiency
of the High Intelligence Ss also indicates that they not
only make better use of information, but that they are more
capable of benefiting from Instructions than the Middle
and Low Intelligence Ss.
In line with the reasoning expressed in the above
hypotheses and discussion, a Memory x Information * Intel-
Ugence interaction on both dependent measures was antici-
pated. Such an interaction, if significant, would indicate
that the cognitive strain imposed by memory requirements and
lack of information reduces the conceptual efficiency of
the Low Intelligence subjects more than the High Intelli-
gence subjects. However, there was no such relationship
and each combination tended to produce the same effect
across levels of intelligence.
At this point, it would be helpful to stress that, to
an extent, these results are a function of the problems
used. It is entirely possible that with another set of
problems, different results would have been obtained with
the Memory and Information conditions by the different Intel-
ligence groups.
It is difficult to understand why the hypothesized
Memory x Information and Memory * Intelligence interactions
of Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported on the variable
of efficiency of problem solving efforts. One possible
explanation for the inf irming of the hypothesized Memory x
intelligence interaction may be that intelligence in a memory
pressure situation may manifest itself more readily in the
products of the conceptual process than in the speed with
which it takes to achieve them.
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oaua9a
mora intelligent Sa to Increase in th.1* - yeir number of Instances
to aolv. successfully and the leas intelugent to rM ^
solve. ^ r9a30n why ^ ^ ^ ^
g»oe sa was not signif
i
csntly greater ,hah ^ lnoMM
.
for the High Intelligent 3, * tha Ho Memory to the Memory
conditio may b. a. follows: the fact that tha Low Intelli-
gent Sa averaged U ln.ta„o. 0 out of . ?6
to solve only an averse of three of the nine problem. In
«« memory condition suggests that many of these problems
••ere not solved within the allott.d number of guess.,.
«han this happened, a subject was given th. score of on.
»ore than th. numbor of Inatanc.s in the problem that he
had failed. Thus, many problems that were failed with in-
creased memory demands were non.th.less counted as eight
or ni„. instance. The effect of this method of scoring
was to reduce th. overell increaae in th. number of in-
stance, used by the Low Intelligence subjects from th.
«o Memory oondition to the Memory condition.
The pattern of the significant Information x Intelli-
gence interaction (Hypothesis 5o) in term, of th, number
of instsnces required for solution mirrors that of the one
for number of problem, solved. It similarly suggests that
70
hV
r°bl9n^— » - .-.irua ana nad. avallab
In evaluating the results and th*
the « « Preceding discussion,one finding that stands out is the infi
m _ t .
UZ 18 influence of infor-a ion on concept attainment. However h«o , because of the
nature of the variables used, the „ ta
- .
Q
'
Q liia*ted knowledge aboutWie processes investigated and ^
fclon , fc
'
the manner in *.ich informa-tio is obtained from subjects, any inferences must be
considered to be largely speculative ones, still, the
-ill* of information to compensate for other handicap.m a learning situation as well », a. i
' "
11
" lt° Influence on bringing
«* Performance or t. mteUlgenc. sublets up to a par
with that or High lnt.Ulg.no. subset,
.no are lacing m
-oass to such information, raises
. series of
that are enable to^ r<>searoh ^^
that oetalleo Information In a mmor7 0OT<mion ,„ ^
to bring
.bout a parlance superior to that or subject,
who lasted It ana the superior performance of Low Intelli-
gence subjects
.ho were given suoh ala over High Intelllgeno.
•ubj.et. who laoaea It, suggests that appropriate ana strate-
gically plaoea information as „n as training m mis. for
the linguistic ana symbolic hanailng or It «, result In a
Significant improvement In concept attainment at all levels
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of intelligence, and that this relative improvement might
be greatest for Low Intelligence subjects.
As an example of building on the results obtained here
we might investigate whether increased amounts of informa-
'
tion are always useful and if not, at what point they
become a handicap and source of confusion. By glvlng vary _
ing amounts of information to different levels of intelli-
gence we can note whether there is a linear relationship
between the amount of information and performance on con-
ceptual tasks. Also, it will enable us to observe in what
way the improvement in performance of different levels 0f
intelligence is a function of increasing amounts of infer-
mation. Another approach could involve the differential
weighting of information in order to see which level of
intelligence made the most use of the most salient hints.
One of the relevant areas that was discussed earlier in the
Introduction warrants consideration here; that is, the
relationship between learning conditions and strategy used.
The wholist strategy is generally regarded to be the most
effective strategy but it must be asked whether this effi-
ciency rests on the nature of the strategy, or its use by
predominantly high intelligence individuals. This question
has not been answered and its ramifications for the teach-
ing process are extremely broad.
SUMMARY
»- Purpose or m, study is to explore th9
»hiP between intelligence X6Tel rad mMory jn oonoept
attainment wh9ro Tai7lng of lnfoMaMon ^ giTen
about th. relevant attributes. One hundred tw.nty Sa B8„
oategorls.d aoooralng Hlgh> Miadie> ^^
ana ware then attributed lnto four combination, of m.fflory
and information. Information-Memory, Information-So Memory
»6 Information-Memory, and Ho Informatio„-No Memory,
subject was exposed to th. serleE of probleM ^ g
manner consistent with the condition i„ ,hloh „. waB ^
two dependant variables
.
the number of problems solved and
the number of inatano.s to solution,
.ere raoorded. It
*" *h«t Low Intelligence Ss would benefit most
fro. th. pres.no. o, information and a no-memory situation.
The results were somewhat contradictory, a. Memory x
Intelligence interaction was significant in the predicted
direotion, but the significant Information x Intelligence
interaction was not in the predicted direction, i.e. th.
High Intelligence subjects benefited most from the preseno.
of information, one of the most interesting rcsulta was
the general, overall potency of detailed information and
th. support it gave to the efforts of Low Intelligence
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subjects when certain handicaps existed in the learning
situation. The implications of these findings were dis-
cussed in the context of teaching rules and principles in
learning situations as opposed to an unstructured, bit by
bit, amassing of information, m addition, the conflicting
performance of the High Intelligence Ss raises questions
as to what variables affect the functioning of this power.
A start was made in considering some of these issues by
suggesting new lines of research.
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APPENDIX
The sequence that the problems are In on the following
pages constitutes the order in which they were administered.
The letters that mark each figure designate the color of
that figure aocording to this key:
R red
G.
. . . . .green
Y yellow
P purple
Or orange
Br . . ,
. .brown
Bl blue
Listen below are the answers to each problem and the
information that was provided for each one in the informa-
tion condition.
Problem
1 (practice)
2 (practice)
3 (practice)
Answer
all of the figs,
within an instance
have the same
outlines
each instance
in the problem
has at least one
blue fig. in It
each instance in
the problem has
a green fig. on
the top and a red
one on the bottom
all of the figs,
within an instance
have different
outlines
Inform ,
outline
top and
bottom oolor
top and
bottom color
outline
each instance in
the problem has
at least one red
fig. in it
each instance in
the problem has
two fig. with the
sane outline
Eaoh instance in
the problem has at
least one dashed
outline in it
each instance in
the problem has at
least two figs,
with the same color
all of the figs, on
the top part of each
instance have the
same color
the ratio of the
number of figs, in
the top to the
number of figs, in
the bottom of each
instance is 2:3
color
outline
outline
color
top
color
number
top and
bottom
eaoh instance in the
problem has at least
one fig. in the top
that has the same color
as at least one of the
same figs, in the bottom
all of the figs, within color
an Instance have differ-
ent colors.
top and
bottom color
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4DKCM R AMINOS OP SUBJECTS ON SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE
TEST OP COLLEGE COARD EXAMINATION
High Int. Middle
Verb. i^uant. Verb.
9 8 5
9 7 5
7 9 S
9 9 5
7 9 6
8 9 5
7 8 6
6 9 6
8 7 6
9 6 5
7 8 5
7 8 6
7 8 6
6 9 5
6 9 5
7 8 6
8 7 6
7 8 5
9 6 6
8 7 6
6 9 5
9 6 5
7 8 5
7 8 5
69 6
8 7 5
8 6 5
7 7 5
7 7 5
8 6 5
8 7 4
7 9 6
7 9 5
8 7 6
7 8 6
8 8 4
6 8 6
8 7 5
5
4
Meani 7.6 7.6 5.3
S.D. .995 1.02
. 57
Int. Low Int.
Quant. Verb. Quant.
6 4 5
6 3 5
6 4 5
6 3 4
6 5 4
6 5 4
5 3 4
5 3 4
5 3 4
6 4 5
6 3 5
5 4 4
5 4 5
6 4 5
6 5 4
5 4 5
5 5 4
6 4 5
S 2 4
5 4 5
6 4 3
6 5 4
6 3 5
6 3 5
5 3 5
5 3 5
5 5 4
5 3 5
o 4 5
5 4 5
6 4 4
5 5 4
5 4 5
6 3 4
4 4 5
6 4 4
6 5 4
5 4 5
5 3 3
__6 4 3
5.5 4.0 4.5
.51 .67 .74
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